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The presence of renewable power generation technologies increases the need for system flexibility due
to their variable nature. The increasing share of variable renewables in European power systems create a
downward adequacy problem, which deals with the ability of power systems to cope with periods of
excess generation. The occurrence of negative prices on Central Western European electricity markets
confirms the relevance of this issue, which is referred to as “incompressibility of power systems” and is
assessed as a barrier for further renewable power integration. The objective of this article is to identify
the main drivers of negative price periods in European balancing markets, by means of both an empirical
and regression analysis. Results confirm a positive relation with the scheduled generation of renewables
and inflexible base load, as well as a negative relation with the scheduled system load. Furthermore, the
occurrence of negative prices is related to the positive and negative forecast error of renewable gener-
ation and demand, respectively. It is concluded that negative balancing market prices provide a market
signal for investments in flexibility sources such as flexible generation, demand response, electricity
storage, and interconnector capacity.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Renewable energy sources for electricity (RES-E) in the Euro-
pean Union have benefited from support schemes for many years,
resulting in a gradual increase of their installed capacity. Annual
installations of wind power and photovoltaic (PV) have increased
over the past decennia, resulting in a total installed capacity of
respectively 101.6 GWand 67.5 GWat the end of 2012 for the EU-28
accompanied by Norway and Switzerland [1]. Table 1 represents
national statistics of Central Western European countries in terms
of the cumulative installed capacities and energy of wind and PV at
the end of 2012. Germany is clearly leading the way, covering 13.6%
of its electricity consumptionwithwind and PV.When compared to
the minimum demand, this may already result in instantaneous
renewable generation levels that exceed the demand. Table 1
shows that Belgium, the Netherlands, and France face lower
average and maximum penetration levels, but trajectories show
that they are also rapidly increasing their renewable generation
mix [2]. In view of the European policy goals towards 2020 andectrical Engineering, Univer-
10, 3001 Heverlee, Belgium.
js).2030, this growth is expected to maintain, gradually increasing the
impact on system and market operation.
Flexibility in power systems indicates the ability to provide
upward and downward power adjustments on different time scales
to maintain the balance between generation and consumption. The
presence of renewable power generation technologies, particularly
wind and PV, increases the need for this flexibility, due to the
variability of their power output [3,4]. This variability may refer to
both output variations and prediction errors [5]. On the one hand,
expected output variations are generally covered by flexible con-
ventional power plants, which are scheduled to balance these
output variations. Consequently, these generating units are to be
characterized by the flexibility to allow certain output variations,
which can be scheduled on day-ahead or intra-day basis. On the
other hand, unpredicted renewable power variations are to be
compensated for in real-time. System flexibility is needed from
power plants which can deviate from their scheduled output pro-
file. In contrast to scheduled variations, prediction errors require
capabilities which allow output variation close to real-time [6,7].
Historically, system operators, regulators and policy makers
were mainly concerned about upward adequacy, which is the
ability of power systems to meet peak demand and avoid load
shedding or black-outs [2,8]. This topic remains relevant today, as
stagnating investments in conventional generation in combination
Table 1
Installed capacity [GW] and annual electricity generation [TWh] of wind and PV at
the end of 2012 [1].
Wind PV
GW TWh Meana
[%]
Maxb
[%]
GW TWh Meana
[%]
Maxb
[%]
Belgium 1.3 2.3 2.70 21.00 2.5 1.6 1.90 40.30
Germany 30.9 46.0 8.50 96.30 32.7 27.6 5.10 101.90
The Netherlands 2.3 5.5 4.70 29.50 0.1 n.a. n.a. 1.30
France 7.5 14.9 3.00 24.40 3.4 3.9 0.80 11.00
a Mean penetration: annual electricity generation relative to total electricity
consumption.
b Max penetration: installed capacity relative to minimum consumption levels.
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increased risk for periodical shortages [9]. However, currently
attention rises for the issue of downward adequacy raising the
question if the current power system is able to cope with periods of
excess generation. Recent observations have shown that these
events are caused by inflexibilities resulting from renewable gen-
eration with low marginal prices, generation support mechanisms,
and priority dispatch, as well as conventional generation technol-
ogies bound by technical ramping constraints such as nuclear po-
wer, or power plants bound by must-run conditions following
operational reserve requirements. This is particularly challenging in
a system where an inelastic demand has to meet supply in real-
time, in the presence of only limited storage capacity.
This issue is referred to as the “incompressibility of power sys-
tems” and is recently observed in different European electricity
markets such as Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands,
with hours showing negative electricity prices, as well on day-
ahead, intra-day and real-time balancing markets [10,11]. These
negative prices represent the scarcity of downward flexibility, and
therefore the difficulty of the system to cope with periods of excess
generation. A better understanding of this phenomenon is thus a
crucial element in adapting power systems to renewable genera-
tion as they induce market signals towards additional flexibility.
Negative prices in the context of forward and day-ahead mar-
kets have already been described extensively in the literature
[12e21]. In contrast, this article focuses on the balancing market
which seems to be more sensitive to price volatility due to its real-
time nature. This market deals with the real-time deviations of
scheduled market positions and is subject to stringent technical
constraints imposed by generating units. Meanwhile, it is particu-
larly challenged by the forecast errors of the increasing shares of
wind and PV in electricity generation.
The objective of this article is to identify parameters which drive
these negative prices on the real-time balancing market, by means
of an empirical and regression analysis. The analysis of negative
imbalance price drivers contributes to a better understanding of
the need and availability of real-time downward flexibility, which
will become more important with a higher share of RES in the
generation mix.
Section 2 extends the background of this article. First, it analyzes
the functioning of balancing markets while focusing on the Belgian
case, taken as a representative example for the EU-28. Furthermore,
a comparison is made with the neighboring Dutch, German, and
French markets due to their interactions with the Belgian system.
Second, relevant negative price drivers are identified according to
an extensive literature review. Section 3 discusses the used data
and applied empirical and regression methods. Section 4 provides
the results of the executed empirical analysis of negative prices in
the Belgian balancing market while identifying potential impactfactors which induce negative imbalance prices. In addition, a
regression analysis is conducted identifying significant indepen-
dent variables with regard to imbalance prices. Finally, Section 5
provides a discussion, while Section 6 states the conclusions of
this article.
2. Theoretical discussion
2.1. Balancing market
2.1.1. Functioning
The Transmission System Operator (TSO) operates on both the
procurement and the settlement side of the balancing market. On
the one hand, the TSO calculates the total system imbalance
resulting from the imbalances of BRPs (Balance Responsible
Parties), and compensates this system imbalance by activating
reserve capacity provided by BSPs (Balance Service Providers). On
the other hand, it settles imbalances with BRPs by applying an
imbalance price. While long-term forward, day-ahead and intra-
day markets are based on forecasts, balancing markets use real-
time information available after the previous markets closed
regarding the need for and value of flexibility [22,23]. The reser-
vation and activation of reserve capacity is thus referred to as the
procurement side of the balancing market, and providers of reserve
capacity are remunerated for their capacity and activation. Reser-
vation costs are settled in the transmission tariffs and activation
costs are transferred to the responsible market players by means of
the imbalance settlement mechanism [24].
Unforeseen events (e.g. unplanned power unit outages or un-
expected demand variations) between gate closure and real-time
are thus dealt with on the balancing market. Today, with the
increasing penetration of variable RES, prediction errors also result
in an additional demand for balancing actions. On the procurement
side the TSO contracts reserve capacity which is, today, mainly
procured from conventional power units, and can be quickly acti-
vated in real-time to cover system imbalances. Usually, a minimum
amount of reserve capacity is required to be contracted through
long-term contracts by the regulator in order to obtain a minimum
guaranteed reserve capacity. Next to the contracted reserves, ca-
pacity can be procured day-ahead. This results in a merit-order
representing the activation cost of reserve capacity [7,25]. Remu-
nerating BSPs can either be by pay-as-cleared pricing or by pay-as-
bid pricing. The former indicates that all units are remunerated at
the marginal price of the system, which is the cost of activating one
more unit of energy and is thus given by the least expensive reserve
capacity that would have to be activated next [26]. The latter in-
dicates that units are paid at their nominated price for the quantity
activated by the TSO, which means that each generating unit re-
ceives a different compensation as different technologies bid at
different prices in order to account for their costs [27].
A key characteristic of the settlement side of balancing markets
is the calculation of imbalance prices. Two types of imbalance price
mechanisms can be identified: a single-pricing scheme and a dual-
pricing scheme. A single-pricing scheme includes an imbalance
price reflecting the marginal activation price of reserves, meaning
that a uniform imbalance price is applied for BRPs facing positive
and negative imbalances in real-time. A dual-pricing scheme in-
cludes a different price for BRPS facing positive and negative im-
balances. When aggravating the system imbalance, the imbalance
price is calculated based on the average activation costs of reserve
capacity. When resolving the system imbalance, the imbalance
price is usually based on day-ahead prices [22,23]. In addition, a
difference also exists between marginal and average pricing. They
are based on either the price of the marginally accepted reserve
capacity bid (marginal pricing) or the average price of all accepted
Fig. 1. Merit order for activating reserve capacity according to ENTSO-E.
Table 2
Characteristics of Central Western European balancing markets.
Settlement
period
Single/dual
pricing
Marginal/
average
pricing
Incentivizing
component
IGCC
participation
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remunerated (pay-as-cleared versus pay-as-bid) [28,29].
In case of a negative system imbalance the TSO activates upward
reserves, which results in a positive price and the TSO pays the BSP
(Fig. 1, right). Reserve capacity is categorized in different categories:
Frequency Containment Reserves (FCR), Frequency Restoration
Reserves (FRR), and Replacement Reserves (RR). FCR is not further
discussed since it is only activated in order to stabilize the fre-
quency after deviations. First upward fast-response FRR including
contracted and free bids from power units, and bids from inter-
ruptible demand can be activated. Second, the slow-response RR
contain contracted and free bids from power units, and possibly a
non-guaranteed emergency capacity from other TSOs [30,31].
In case of a positive system imbalance the TSO activates
downward reserves, which can result in both positive and negative
prices and thus the BSP pays the TSO or the TSO pays the BSP (Fig. 1,
left). Downward reserves are provided by fast-response FRR
including contracted and free bids from power units, and slow-
response RR containing free bids and possibly downward emer-
gency capacity from neighboring TSOs. These downward reserves
actually represent generators willing to lower their output, and
since their energy is already sold in the forward market, they are
usually willing to pay the TSO an amount which represents their
saved operating costs. The TSO compensates the BRP having an
excess supply by that (relatively small) amount. However, when
facing scarcity, downward flexibility providers may bid positive
activation prices, i.e. being paid for the service, leading to negative
imbalance prices. In this case the BRPs facing a positive imbalance
have to compensate the TSO instead of being paid for their excess
supply [30,31].
2.1.2. The Belgian balancing market
In Belgium, a single-pricing scheme is applied, in which the
imbalance price reflects the marginal procurement price of re-
serves. Thus the ‘same’ imbalance price is applied for short and long
positions1 after gate closure. However, this price is not always the
same for long and short positions, as the Belgian imbalance prices
must provide an incentive to BRPs to maintain balance in their
portfolio. Therefore, when facing a large system imbalance, an
additional incentivizing component is applied to ‘punish’ the BRPs
contributing to the system imbalance. Balancing prices are calcu-
lated every 15 min. Since October 2013 the Belgian system1 BRPs facing a negative imbalance hold a short position, BRPs facing a positive
imbalance hold a long position.imbalance is netted with other control zones by means of the In-
ternational Grid Cooperation and Control (IGCC), which was
initially designed for a better cooperation by the German TSOs
(GCC). GCC covers four modules, which have all been implemented
in Germany. IGCC currently only includesmodule one, which avoids
counteracting activation of balancing resources through controlled
and targeted real-time imbalance exchange between control areas.
Elia is connected indirectly to Germany via the Dutch TSO ‘TenneT’.
Table 2 briefly compares some important characteristics of the
Belgian [25,31], German [32,33], Dutch [34,35], and French [36,37]
balancing markets.2.2. Negative electricity price drivers
The main contribution of this article is the focus on the
balancing market and the statistical analysis of the considered
explanatory variables. The conclusions of the existing studies
focusing on forward and day-ahead markets are discussed in this
section as they provide insight in relevant explanatory variables.
Economic theory imposes that low demand together with a high
supply at nearly-zero marginal cost results in lower market prices.
In addition, literature shows that the simultaneous occurrence of
high renewables generation and low system demand results in
relatively expensive downward flexibility [12,13,16e18,20,21]. Even
less flexibility is available when more base load units are online,
due to stringent operational constraints (i.e. start-up costs, limited
ramping rates, and longminimum up and downtimes) [12,14,16,19].
Finally, tight downward flexibility can also occur when the units
that are online cannot shut down because they are contracted to
provide reserve capacity [11,14,19]. Incompressibility can be
defined as the lack of downward system flexibility [11], which may
occur when there is a combination of a relatively low system load
(i.e. usually during the weekend, night, or summer) and high non-
flexible generation (i.e. wind, PV, inflexible base load), as this cre-
ates a generation surplus. Activation of scarce downward flexibility
may result in negative prices.
The exact impact of variable RES generation on the activation of
reserve capacity depends on a wide set of parameters [23]. First of
all, the impact depends on the accuracy of forecast systems.
Although the accuracy of wind and PV forecast systems steadily
increases, forecast errors are expected to keep occurring [38].
Secondly, it strongly depends on the geographical spread and
location of RES capacity, as renewable power output varies over
time and location, and a geographically balanced portfolio may
result in the smoothing of the variations and RES output forecast
errors [23,39]. Thirdly, the impact depends on its correlation with
other system imbalance drivers such as demand variability and
unplanned power plant outages [12]. Although the exact impact of
more renewables generation on the system imbalance depends on
multiple factors, large-scale RES deployment is expected to in-
crease the balancing needs of power systems [40,41].
In themeantime, conventional power, being the largest provider
of balancing services, is gradually being replaced by renewable
power generation. This results in a tight balancingmarket, facing anBelgium 15 min Single Marginal Yes Yes
Germany 15 min Single Average Yes Yes
The Netherlands 15 min Single Marginal Yes Yes
France 30 min Dual Average No No
Table 3
Relative frequency of negative imbalance prices and basic statistics of four European
balancing markets.
Negative
prices [%]
Mean price
[V/MWh]
Min. price
[V/MWh]
Max. price
[V/MWh]
Belgium 6.78 49.96 313.38 1488.20
Germany 21.08 34.19 2498.40 1608.20
The Netherlands 6.73 49.94 450.66 600.00
France 0.42 42.73 200.00 283.17
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and may lead to the occurrence of periods experiencing negative
imbalance prices. The occurrence of negative prices on the
balancingmarket can be seen as a market signal which represents a
relative scarcity of cheap downward flexibility when facing positive
system imbalances.
Finally, a relevant factor in analyzing the phenomena of negative
prices is the fact that curtailment possibilities for RES-E generation
are currently restricted [42]. This means that it is generally not
encouraged or allowed to restrict wind or PV power generation,
while conventional energy generation units are still online [43].
However, curtailment of renewable power generation in hours with
an excess supply might serve as an incentive for investors to locate
new renewable power units in locations with little risk of curtail-
ment, and thereby geographically spreading renewable power
generation units and its resulting output variations [42].
3. Material and methods
This section describes the methods used to evaluate recent
imbalance prices for the Belgian control zone. A dataset of one year
(1st of December 2012e 30th of November 2013), published by the
Belgian TSO [44], is empirically analyzed in Section 4.1. As the
settlement of the balancing market prices is done on a quarter-
hourly period, the entire dataset consists of 35,040 entries. The
relative frequency of negative imbalance prices is discussed,
together with some basic statistics comparison with the four
neighboring balancing markets. The data used to construct the
accompanying Tables and Figures is publicly available at the web-
sites of the Belgian, Dutch, German, and French TSOs [33,44e46].
The relation between the occurrence of negative imbalance prices
and the selected drivers is analyzed by means of a statistical anal-
ysis. The selected drivers are chosen based on the conclusions of the
literature review (Section 2.2).
The regression analysis, which is discussed in Section 4.2, uses
the same dataset based on explanatory variables identified in the
empirical analysis. These variables are the independent variables,
which will all be tested for their significance and impact on the
Belgian imbalance price, i.e. the dependent variable. The executed
regression analysis shows the presence of a positive or negative
relation between the independent variables and the dependent
variable, as well as the percentage of the variance in the imbalance
price that is explained by each independent variable. The signifi-
cance of the tested independent variables is identified on the basis
of a correlation analysis on each of the independent variables with
the dependent variable [47].
After analyzing the regression models with SPSS, a software
package used for statistical analysis, it is concluded that all neces-
sary conditions to analyze the specified dataset by a linear regres-
sion analysis are met [48,49]. Important to note is that this
statistical software calculates the probability that the tested vari-
able is insignificant. A significance value lower than or equal to 0.01
means that the probability that the hypothesis is correct is lower
than or equal to 1%. In other words, the hypothesis can be rejected
with a confidence level of 99% or more, meaning that the inde-
pendent variable is significant with regard to the dependent vari-
able with at least 99% certainty.
4. Results
4.1. Imbalance price observations: empirical investigation
When studying time series of the Belgian imbalance prices, it
can be noted that negative prices are recorded in 6.78% of the time,
while minima are registered at 313.38 V/MWh. These values arecompared to the neighboring German, French, and Dutch balancing
markets (Table 3). Germany has the highest occurrence rate of
negative prices (21.08%), the Netherlands holds more or less the
same rate as Belgium (6.73%), and in France negative prices only
occurred in less than 0.5% of the time (which is attributed to the
imbalance price calculation method).
According to Section 2.2, potential drivers for the occurrence of
negative prices are (i) inflexible base load units, (ii) RES power
injections, and (iii) system load. In addition, as stated before
renewable power generation technologies increase the need for
flexibility due to their large variability, consisting of both expected
output variations and forecast errors. Therefore the following par-
agraphs first discuss the observed relation between expected
output variations in renewable power generation and system load
(which are dealt with on the day-ahead market), and the occur-
rence of negative imbalance prices. Second, the observed relation
between the renewables power forecast error and load forecast
error (which are dealt with on the real-time balancing market), and
the occurrence of negative imbalance prices is discussed.
The upper four graphs of Fig. 2 display the observed relation
between the occurrence of negative prices (shown on the vertical
axis on the left hand side) and the predicted hourly average power
of wind and PV, and hourly average predicted load and net load. In
addition, the probability of occurrence of the specified predicted
value bins is shown on the right hand side. The predicted net load
in this article is defined as the remaining load which has to be
covered by flexible base load, mid load, and peak load power plants.
Therefore it is calculated by subtracting the inflexible base load
generation, i.e. the nuclear power generation for Belgium, and the
renewables generation, from the forecasted load. For the occur-
rence of negative prices there seems to be a positive relation with
the forecasted wind and PV power generation, and a negative
relation with the forecasted load and net load. This relation is
illustrated by the dark gray lines (left axis), as they represent the
probability of an imbalance price to be negative when we find
ourselves in that specified independent variable bin. In addition,
the graphs in Fig. 2 also display light gray columns (right axis),
representing the probability of being in the specified bin. For
example, when looking at the day-ahead forecasted load it can be
noted that the lower the load, the higher the probability of an
imbalance price being negative, as the left axis for example states
that the probability is 18% for day-ahead forecasted loads less than
7000 MW in contrast to only 2% for loads more than 11,000 MW. In
addition, the probability of being in a lower load bin is generally
lower than being in a higher load bin, as the right axis for example
states that the probability is 7% for day-ahead forecasted loads less
than 7000 MW in contrast to 10% for loads more than 11,000 MW.
The lower four graphs of Fig. 2 show the observed characteris-
tics of the occurrence of negative imbalance prices (shown on the
vertical axis on the left hand side) with regard to forecast error of
wind, PV, load, and net load. These forecast errors are calculated by
taking the difference between the real-time observed value and the
day-ahead forecasted value, thus a positive forecast error means
that the real-time value is higher than forecasted, and vice versa.
The net load forecast error is calculated as the aggregated forecast
Fig. 2. Probability of the occurrence of negative imbalance prices and probability of independent variables.
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forecast error represents a negative system imbalance and there-
fore a need for upward reserves. A negative net load forecast error
means that there is a positive system imbalance and downward
reserves need to be activated. Based on the observed values,
negative prices have a higher probability to occur during periods
experiencing more wind power than forecasted, more PV power
than forecasted, less load than forecasted, and less net load than
forecasted. For example, when looking at the load forecast error
graph it can be noted that the lower the forecast error, the higher
the probability of an imbalance price being negative (left axis), and
it can also be noted that extreme load forecast errors only have a
small probability to occur compared to moderate load forecast er-
rors (right axis).
The previous observations identified potential negative and
positive relationships between (i) predicted variations of renew-
ables power generation and load, and negative imbalance prices on
the one hand, and (ii) forecast errors of renewable power genera-
tion and load, and negative imbalance prices on the other hand. The
flowchart shown in Fig. 3 shows those variables and illustrates their
influence towards the imbalance price. However, two additional
variables that were not analyzed e power plant outages and con-
tracted reserves e also have to be taken into account but fall
outside the scope of this article. On day-ahead the amount of
available reserves and real-time flexibility is determined, as illus-
trated by the upper path in Fig. 3. The lower part of Fig. 3 illustrates
how the volume of requested reserves and real-time flexibility is
determined in real-time. First, it can be noted that the day-ahead
forecasts determine the theoretical day-ahead predicted net load,
and lowered by the scheduled inflexible base load units this de-
termines the commitment and output of scheduled flexible base
load, mid load, and peak load plants. The amount of scheduled
conventional flexible power units and their scheduled power
output consequently determines the available flexibility for the
next day. Second, the forecast errors and power plant outages
determine the BRPs' real-time imbalances, which aggregated form
the system imbalance. The system imbalance determines the net
regulated volume, representing the requested reserves and flexi-
bility by the TSO. The interaction between available and requested
reserve capacity consequently determines the imbalance price.Fig. 3. Flowchart identifying poteBased on the constructed flowchart displayed in Fig. 3, a nega-
tive imbalance price matrix is constructed and displayed in Fig. 4. It
is illustrated that the combination of a high demand for downward
reserves, resulting from forecast errors regarding renewable power
generation, load, and power plant outages, with a low availability of
cheap downward reserve capacity, resulting from the power plant
scheduling based on day-ahead information, can lead to the
occurrence of negative prices in the real-time balancing market.
4.2. Regression analysis
In this section the previously discussed observations and vari-
ables will be analyzed and tested through a series of linear
regression analyses. The significance of the above stated variables is
tested, including the presence of a positive or negative relation
between the independent variables and the imbalance price, and
the explanatory value of the individual independent variables is
provided.
Each independent variable is found significant with at least 99%
certainty, since their significance value is lower than 0.01 (Table 4).
Aside from the significance value, Table 4 displays the regression
equation (consisting of an intercept and a slope) and the R Square
value for each of the tested independent variables. The regression
coefficients, represented by the slope of the regression equation,
display the change in the dependent variable-value (the Belgian
imbalance price) when the independent variable rises with 1 unit. R
Square, also referred to as correlation coefficient, is the percentage
of variance in the dependent variable that is explained by the in-
dependent variable. This is calculated as the correlation between
the actual independent variable-values and the independent
variable-values predicted by the regression model. This correlation
coefficient proves to be the highest for the net load forecast error
and the lowest for the day-ahead forecasted wind power.
The day-ahead forecasted wind power and PV power are
negatively correlated with the imbalance price. The higher their
values, the lower the day-ahead net load, which results in less
scheduled conventional flexible power units and at lower run. This
in turn means that there naturally is a low margin for downward
regulation of these plants, i.e. little downward flexibility. Note that
even if this flexibility is ensured by means of adequate contractedntial imbalance price drives.
Fig. 4. Matrix illustrating the probability of negative imbalance prices.
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low to negative prices, due to scarcity. In contrast to the scheduled
renewable generation, the day-ahead forecasted load and net load
is positively correlated with the imbalance price. The lower its
value, the lower the day-ahead load and net load, again resulting in
low-scheduled conventional power and consequently less or
expensive flexibility for downward regulation.
Table 4 shows that the renewables forecast errors are negatively
correlated with the imbalance price. If there is more renewable
power than forecasted this generally results in a positive system
imbalance, requiring downward reserve capacity to be activated.
The load forecast error and net load forecast error are positively
correlated with the imbalance price. If there is less load and less net
load than forecasted, a positive system imbalance occurs leading to
a need for downward reserve capacity. Typically, more requested
downward reserve capacity results in a lower imbalance price, as
they are selected according to a merit order of decreasing resulting
imbalance prices.5. Discussion
Negative imbalance prices are the result of a temporary
discrepancy between the need and availability of real-time down-
ward flexibility, i.e. downward reserve capacity. On the one hand,
the need for real-time flexibility increases with the share of
renewable generation. On the other hand, the availability of real-
time flexibility decreases with the share of renewable generation
as it replaces conventional generation, historically the main pro-
vider of balancing services. On the operational level, when
expecting a low net load, conventional generators tend to operate
at lower output levels, reducing the downward flexibility available.
Large unexpected excess generation results in negative prices,
which indicates the need for downward flexibility.
The occurrence of negative imbalance prices is thus a market
signal reflecting scarcity of downward flexibility during periods
with excess supply. It has to be taken into account that theTable 4
Individual regression outcome for the identified independent variables.
Significant Value Intercept Slope R Square
DA forecast wind power Yes 0.001 51.077 0.003 0.0003
DA forecast PV power Yes 0.000 52.388 0.008 0.005
DA forecast load Yes 0.000 54.828 0.012 0.083
DA forecast net load Yes 0.000 19.129 0.008 0.077
Wind power forecast error Yes 0.000 50.045 0.105 0.033
PV power forecast error Yes 0.000 48.673 0.084 0.040
load forecast error Yes 0.000 44.497 0.034 0.067
net load forecast error Yes 0.000 43.586 0.036 0.100imbalance price is largely impacted by the market design. The
calculation method can to a large extent affect the occurrence of
negative imbalance prices. In average pricing systems negative
imbalance prices can only occur in periods experiencing aweighted
average price that is negative, which only occurs in extreme cir-
cumstances. Although average pricing results in less negative prices
than marginal pricing, marginal pricing is believed to reflect the
current market situation to all market participants to a better
extent than average pricing. This leads to the observation that
negative prices have to be viewed upon as market reflective.
These market signals provide an incentive for market partic-
ipants to integrate new flexibility which is able to provide close-
to-real-time downward power adjustments. In general, four
categories of flexibility sources can be identified in electricity
systems: flexible demand, flexible supply, storage capacity, grid
capacity. With flexible supply downward adjustments are
equivalent to a decrease in generation by reducing their fuel
intake. We can expect that downward flexibility will also be
provided by RES by means of curtailing their power output.
However, currently RES generators have no incentive to curtail
generation at excess supply periods as they receive a generation-
based support, except for moments when facing extremely
negative prices, thereby offsetting their received support. For
flexible demand this implies an increase of consumption, for
instance resulting from shifting consumption towards low or
negative price periods. Electricity storage capacity is able to
provide downward power adjustments by means of charging the
storage system. Finally, the transmission grid is also a potential
provider of downward power adjustments through exporting
excess generation to neighboring regions.6. Conclusions
This article investigates the occurrence of negative imbalance
prices in Central Western Europe. After discussing the balancing
market design, both an empirical and regression analysis is con-
ducted on the parameters which are influencing the balancing
market prices. It is found that on the one hand, the negative
imbalance prices are substantially induced by the expected gen-
eration of wind and PV in low load periods, reducing the availability
of downward flexibility necessary for downward regulation. This
increases the activation price for downward reserve capacity,
resulting in negative prices when facing high positive system im-
balances. On the other hand, renewable generation and load pre-
diction errors driving positive system imbalances contribute to the
occurrence of negative imbalance prices through the need for
expensive downward reserve activation in periods of scarce
downward flexibility.
T. Brijs et al. / Renewable Energy 80 (2015) 53e6060It is concluded that the occurrence of these negative prices is not
a problem as such, as they may provide correct short-term and
long-term signals towards the need for flexibility, and facilitate
their business case. These flexible technologies include electricity
storage, demand response, interconnection capacity, and flexible
generation. However, this price can be affected by the electricity
market design such as renewable generation support mechanisms,
or imbalance price calculation methods that are not cost reflective,
thereby distorting the market price.
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